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When David Hoff man taught law at the University of Maryland in the 
1820s, he devoted his fi rst few classes to the topic he thought would be most 
practical for future lawyers—“the fundamental principles of Morals and of 
Natural Law.” Students needed to learn natural law, he explained, because 
as lawyers they would fi nd in court opinions “perpetual references to the 
elementary principles of that science.”1 Hoff man’s students would eventually 
get a tour of the American legal landscape in all its technical splendor, but that 
was no way to start, he believed, because the law “is not a system of merely 
positive and arbitrary rules. It has its deep foundations in the universal laws 
of our moral nature, and, all its positive enactments, proceeding on these, 
must receive their just interpretation with a reference to them.” How could 
one interpret a statute or a contract “without knowledge of the general 
principles on which they are promulgated or entered into?” Why were statutes 
presumed not to apply retroactively, if not because of “the principle of natural 
law, or ethicks, that associations are bound only by rules to which they have 
consented?” What were the rules of evidence “but metaphysical and ethical 
modes of investigating truth on the one hand, and limiting our deductions 
by a regard to human rights and feelings, and to our moral constitution, on 
the other?” In all these respects and many more, Hoff man declared, a lawyer 
could scarcely practice “without knowledge of the true principles of moral and 
political philosophy.”2 Hoff man aimed to make his students “practice-ready,” 
as we might put it today. Practicing lawyers used natural law, so law students 
needed to learn it.
Today, of course, few law schools, if any, begin with natural law. Most 
students probably graduate without encountering it at all. If students do 
learn about natural law, it is likely to be in an elective course not advertised 
as useful for practicing lawyers, such as a course in the philosophy of law or 
1. DAVID HOFFMAN, A LECTURE BEING THE SECOND OF A SERIES OF LECTURES, INTRODUCTORY TO 
A COURSE OF LECTURES NOW DELIVERING IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 15 (1825).
2. DAVID HOFFMAN, A LECTURE, INTRODUCTORY TO A COURSE OF LECTURES, NOW DELIVERING 
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 44-45 (1823).
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the history of legal thought. The reason is not hard to fi nd. Natural law is no 
longer part of the lawyer’s toolkit. If a lawyer were to say, “Your Honor, before 
I discuss the applicable statutes and precedent, I will begin with the law of 
nature,” the judge would have a puzzled look, and opposing counsel would 
start planning the victory party. When lawyers stopped using natural law, law 
schools stopped teaching it.
But was David Hoff man right? What role did natural law actually play 
in law practice? And was he typical? How did natural law feature in legal 
education? These are the questions Richard Helmholz sets out to answer 
in Natural Law in Court, not just for the early United States but also for early 
modern England and continental Europe. As Helmholz points out, no one 
has ever seriously tried to answer these questions. While philosophers and 
historians of philosophy have written a lot about natural law, little has been 
written about natural law as a topic in the history of legal practice or legal 
education.3 American lawyers today may know a few prominent examples of 
the use of natural law in early American legal documents. The Declaration of 
Independence says that humans “are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights.” The 1798 Supreme Court case Calder v. Bull4 includes a 
well-known exchange between Justices Samuel Chase and James Iredell 
regarding the role of natural law in interpreting statutes. But that tells us little 
about ordinary law practice. How often did lawyers use natural law? How 
much did students learn about it?
Natural Law in Court answers these questions. The fi rst third of the book 
covers continental Europe between roughly 1500 and 1800, the middle third 
covers England during the same period, and the fi nal third covers the United 
States between the Revolution and the Civil War. Helmholz is one of very few 
people who could have written all three parts. Each of these three sections is 
divided into two chapters, one on legal education and the other on litigation. 
The chapters on legal education rely on treatises and books written specifi cally 
for students, while the chapters on litigation focus on published court cases. 
Each chapter rests on an enormous amount of learning, presented very lightly. 
While discussing the English treatise literature, for example, Helmholz tosses 
off  a paragraph (pp. 91-92) that cites 85 diff erent authors. A similar paragraph 
(pp. 139-140) on the American treatises cites 62.
Helmholz shows that in all three contexts natural law was discussed fairly 
often, both in litigation and in materials intended for students. There is 
no way to know exactly how often. Published records of litigation and legal 
instruction represent an unknowable and varying percentage, and probably a 
very small percentage, of the total amount of litigation and legal instruction 
3. From philosophers, see, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); 
ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (1999). From historians of philosophy, 
see, e.g., KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO 
THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (1996); BRIAN TIERNEY, LIBERTY AND LAW: THE IDEA OF 
PERMISSIVE NATURAL LAW, 1100-1800 (2014).
4. 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
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that took place. But Helmholz is able to demonstrate that natural law appeared 
regularly, for centuries, in litigation and in legal education. He presents enough 
evidence to be able to reject sweeping statements in either direction, either 
that natural law was ubiquitous or that it was absent. The truth is somewhere 
in between. Natural law was part of the lawyer’s toolkit—not the only part, but 
part nonetheless. David Hoff man was right, and he was typical.
Much of Natural Law in Court is taken up with a description of the settings 
in which natural law was frequently invoked. Helmholz fi nds that natural 
law often fi gured in procedural matters, such as whether a defendant had 
received adequate notice of the charge against him. Natural law arose in cases 
involving marriage and inheritance. It was invoked when individuals alleged 
that government offi  cials had abused their power, although this role became 
less important in the United States, where a written constitution took over 
from natural law as the main vehicle for challenging government power.
The most interesting of these settings from the perspective of a present-day 
American lawyer is the use of natural law in statutory interpretation, another 
practice Helmholz shows was common in Europe, England, and the United 
States. He explains that natural law was not used to “strike down” legislation 
in the modern sense of judicial review, but rather to interpret legislation. 
For example, in a case decided by Lord Mansfi eld in 1771, the King’s Bench 
interpreted a 13th-century statute providing that goods washed up on shore 
after a shipwreck belong to the Crown, unless a man, a dog, or a cat survived 
the shipwreck (pp. 114-15). In this case, no one survived the shipwreck, not even 
any of the dogs or cats, but the goods washed up on shore. They consisted 
of several barrels of tallow that clearly belonged to the plaintiff —he had sent 
them on the boat and was trying to recover them. The language of the statute 
pointed against the plaintiff , but Mansfi eld determined that awarding the 
tallow to the Crown would be contrary to natural law. He accordingly looked 
to the purpose of the statute, which he concluded was to ensure that goods 
were returned to their true owner. If a survivor of the shipwreck could identify 
the owner of the goods, or if a surviving dog or cat was seen to recognize the 
owner, a court could be confi dent that a claimant was the true owner. When 
the statute was interpreted in the light of natural law, it was not an arbitrary 
rule specifi cally about dogs and cats, but rather an injunction to award 
shipwrecked goods to claimants only if there was no doubt about the goods’ 
ownership. Mansfi eld accordingly awarded the tallow to the plaintiff .
The reason such examples are so interesting is that one can readily imagine 
an American judge reaching the same conclusion today by invoking one of 
the standard canons of statutory interpretation, without the use, or at least 
without the explicit use, of natural law. The argument would go: (1) statutes are 
interpreted so as to avoid reaching absurd results, because we assume that the 
legislature is composed of rational people trying to pursue sensible goals; (2) 
it would be absurd to award the tallow to the Crown when we know for certain 
whose tallow it is; (3) the legislature intended the business about dogs and cats 
to help resolve cases of uncertainty, not cases like this, in which the legislature 
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would have wanted to return the tallow to its true owner; and therefore (4) 
the plaintiff  wins. Indeed, a modern lawyer who is accustomed to this sort 
of reasoning but unaccustomed to natural law could easily miss Mansfi eld’s 
invocation of natural law, because otherwise Mansfi eld’s reasoning seems so 
familiar.
We can make the same comparison the other way around as well, by looking 
for modern examples of statutory interpretation with reference to canons of 
construction, and then considering how these cases would have been handled 
in an era when lawyers spoke in terms of natural law. For instance, in a recent 
case called Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a statute that 
made it a crime to transmit a threat to injure another person. The defendant 
argued that despite the menacing tone of his words, he had not intended 
to threaten anyone—he was merely an aspiring rap artist who intended his 
violent lyrics as art. The statute did not say that the defendant had to intend 
his words to be a threat. The statute included no requirement of a mental state 
at all. The Court nevertheless concluded that some culpable mental state was 
a requirement, based not on the text of the statute but on the background 
principle that crimes generally require mental states. To show that this truly 
was a background principle undergirding the criminal law, the Court cited 
several of its prior opinions applying the principle.5 Such citations make 
perfect sense today, when there is no source of law outside of written texts, 
and when one can believe that somewhere in Congress there are lawyers who 
draft the precise words of statutes and who are aware that their words will be 
interpreted in light of this background principle.6
How would this case have been decided in the 18th century? A judge could 
easily have reached the same conclusion, but rather than locating the source 
of the background principle in the court’s own prior opinions, the judge could 
have identifi ed the requirement of a mental state as a principle of natural 
law. This natural principle, that conduct is criminal only when the defendant 
has a blameworthy mind, would not have been invoked to strike down the 
statute but rather to interpret it, in accordance with the presumed desire of the 
legislature to accomplish a just result.
Of course, the presumption of a mental state is hardly the only canon of 
statutory construction courts use today. But where do these principles come 
from? Today we say that they come from court opinions, and that courts are 
justifi ed in applying them because they are so widely known that they form a 
backdrop against which legislatures write. A couple of centuries ago, lawyers 
might have said that they are principles of natural law that properly guide our 
interpretation of statutes because legislators are striving to accomplish just 
5. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009-10 (2015). 
6. On the empirical plausibility of the latter claim, see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part I,  65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside: An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 
II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014).
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ends. In a legal culture that included natural law, the outcomes of cases might 
well have been the same, but the path of reasoning toward those outcomes 
would have been quite diff erent.
Natural Law in Court is full of down-to-earth examples like the case of the 
shipwrecked tallow, examples that should cause present-day lawyers to start 
thinking about other modern substitutes for tasks that were once handled 
by natural law. For example, court opinions today often include what are 
sometimes called “policy arguments,” which tend to be appeals to normative 
principles that are presumably uncontroversial among legal professionals. The 
common law governing found property, for example, is sometimes justifi ed 
with reference to the policy goal of returning property to its true owner. That 
goal is typically not itself found in legislation; rather, it is assumed to be one 
that everyone wants to advance. In an earlier era, it might have been posited 
as a principle of natural law.
Helmholz set out to assess the importance of natural law in law practice and 
legal education between the 16th and 19th centuries. In that respect, Natural Law 
in Court is a smashing success. But the book also achieves an equally important 
goal that Helmholz may not have pursued: It makes the concept of natural 
law understandable to the modern lawyer. Today, the idea of using natural law 
in court seems at fi rst quite foreign and even backward, a practice that smacks 
of superstition, like witch trials or trial by ordeal. But the lawyers and judges 
who appear in Natural Law in Court are not like that at all. They are people quite 
like us, making arguments with a diff erent vocabulary than ours but otherwise 
very similar. On Helmholz’s telling, natural law becomes much less strange.
Sometime in the 19th century natural law began a slow decline, until it 
virtually dropped out of our courts and thus our law schools. Part of the reason 
must have something to do with the simultaneous separation of religion from 
public political life. Americans may not have become any less religious, but 
religion gradually came to be redefi ned as a private, personal realm, separate 
from institutions of government. But this is unlikely to be the whole answer, 
because natural law was not entirely a religious phenomenon. Natural laws 
are found in nature but they need not be created by a God. Today we still 
speak of scientifi c laws as natural laws. In the social domain we speak of the 
laws of supply and demand, the law of diminishing returns, and the like. Any 
recurring and non-humanly created pattern of experience could be described 
as a principle of natural law—the proposition that children tend to be more 
energetic than adults, for example, or that absolute power corrupts. Human 
beings are parts of nature. The other parts of nature, even other kinds of 
animals, are governed by natural laws. “There is nothing in nature which 
has not its laws,” Henry St. George Tucker lectured the law students at the 
University of Virginia in the 1840s. “If there be a law for all other created 
things, why not for man!”7 One can easily imagine an alternative legal history in 
which a non-religious natural law persisted, losing its Christian grounding 
but acquiring a scientifi c or social-scientifi c grounding instead. But that is not 
7. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A FEW LECTURES ON NATURAL LAW 3, 5 (1844).
433Book Review: Natural Law in Court: A History of Legal Theory in Practice
what happened, at least not in the explicit vocabulary of the legal system. 
Instead we gradually adopted a new style of argument in which natural law no 
longer counted as authority.
Helmholz concludes Natural Law in Court by suggesting natural law’s 
limitations. “It did not abolish slavery,” he notes. “It did not end judicial 
torture. It did not require payment of a ‘living wage.’ It did not prevent the 
oppression of native peoples in the Americas. It did not prevent what by our 
lights seem to have been serious miscarriages of justice” (pp. 177-178). As he 
points out, these limitations would not have come as any surprise to the lawyers 
he discusses, who would not have entertained any such hopes. The principles 
of natural law that could be put to practical use in litigation were but a small 
subset of the moral principles to which people aspired in their everyday lives. 
“Human laws are imperfect in this respect,” acknowledged the lawyer-poet 
Francis Scott Key. “The sphere of morality is more extensive than the limits 
of civil jurisdiction.”8 Natural law was fundamental, in the sense that it was 
believed to undergird the legal system, but natural law was also modest in its 
actual application. Natural Law in Court amply demonstrates both propositions.
8. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 193 (1817) (arguments of counsel). Key was arguing, successfully, 
that while it might be immoral for a contracting party to exploit his superior knowledge, it 
was not illegal.
